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  OPINION 
_____________________            
 
SMITH, Circuit Judge. 
 No mother wants to see her daughter go to prison, no 
matter how frayed their relationship.  In some cases, a mother 
may attempt to take the blame for her daughter’s crime.  
Pennsylvania, like the federal system, requires courts to 
evaluate such inculpatory statements for indicia of 
truthfulness in order to ensure that justice is not being 
subverted.  Here, on the eve of Candice Staruh’s homicide 
trial, her mother Lois “confessed” to a horrific crime during 
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an interview with a defense investigator – despite having 
denied responsibility for two and a half years.  When she did 
confess, she refused to do so under circumstances that would 
have subjected her to criminal liability.  For example, she 
never confessed to the prosecutor and she refused to testify at 
trial.  A Pennsylvania court refused to admit Lois’ hearsay 
confession at her daughter’s trial, and the District Court 
denied the daughter’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  On 
appeal, Candice Staruh argues that this refusal to admit a 
hearsay confession violated her due process right to present 
her defense.  She relies heavily upon the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973).  
For the reasons stated below we will affirm.   
 I. 
 On October 27, 2003, emergency medical services 
responded to a call concerning an unresponsive child at a 
home in Newville, Pennsylvania.  When they arrived, three-
year-old Jordan was not breathing and did not have a pulse.  
The emergency medical technicians (“EMTs”) observed 
bruises all over Jordan’s body, with some that were 
particularly severe across his ribs.  They also noticed vomit 
on the floor, on Jordan’s face and neck, and in his mouth.   
 Jordan’s mother, Candice Staruh, is the 
Defendant/Appellant in this case.  The EMTs asked her about 
the bruising and she told them that the bruising was caused by 
a combination of prior falls and horseplay with Jordan’s four-
year-old brother Kamden.  Staruh told them that “[Jordan] fell 
[off of a stool] and hit his head on a metal door before he fell 
onto the floor.”  JA 309.  Jordan was transported to Carlisle 
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Hospital, where hospital staff were unable to revive him.  
Staruh repeated her version of the story to the coroner and to 
the investigating police officers: that Jordan had fallen off of 
a stool and that the bruises were the result of prior falls and 
horseplay with Kamden.   
 A forensic pathologist conducted an autopsy of Jordan 
during which significant bruising to Jordan’s abdomen, sides, 
and back were examined.  The pathologist concluded that the 
bruises were a mix of older and more recent injuries, and that 
they were too severe to have been caused by his four-year-old 
brother.  He also found gray material, consistent with duct 
tape, on Jordan’s back, and the pattern of bruising on the 
abdomen and back were consistent with being bound by duct 
tape.  The pathologist determined that Jordan’s death was 
caused by blunt force trauma to the head and neck and 
deemed the manner of death to be a homicide.   
 The police investigation noted the deplorable state of 
the house where Staruh lived with her three children – Jordan, 
Kamden, and an infant brother.  The house was owned by 
Staruh’s mother, Lois, who also lived with Staruh and the 
children.  Investigators saw diapers on the floor, kitchen 
faucets that did not work, a sink overflowing with dirty 
dishes, and toilets that were used without water.  The house 
smelled of garbage, and animal droppings were found 
throughout the kitchen.   
 Staruh was arrested and charged with first and third 
degree murder, aggravated assault, and endangering the 
welfare of a child.  Lois was also arrested and shortly 
thereafter, on June 24, 2005, pleaded guilty to endangering 
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the welfare of children.  At her plea agreement hearing, her 
attorney added that Lois was not admitting to causing any 
injury to Jordan, as she had only violated her duty of care 
regarding the condition of her home.   
 While in jail awaiting trial, Staruh told one cellmate 
that she had made sandwiches for her children on the day of 
Jordan’s death.  According to this version, Jordan was sitting 
on a stool, tearing his sandwich apart, which caused her to 
become angry.  She told this cellmate that she backhanded 
Jordan, causing him to flip off of his stool and hit his head on 
the heater.  Staruh told another cellmate that when she woke 
up, she found Jordan in the kitchen making a mess and so she 
slapped him, causing him to fall and hit his head on the 
entertainment stand.   
 On October 27, 2003, Kamden and the infant were 
placed in foster care.  Kamden made comments to several 
people about what he saw on the night that his younger 
brother Jordan died.  First, in a videotaped interview with 
Karen Helfman, a child interview specialist at Children’s 
Resource Center, Kamden was asked about his “friend 
Jordan.”  JA 528.1  Kamden said that Jordan was in heaven 
now because his mother smacked his face, causing Jordan to 
                                                 
1 The Children’s Resource Center is an organization where 
children are brought “if there has been suspected abuse or 
they have witnessed a violent crime.”  JA 521.  Its employees 
are given no information about the child or about the event 
witnessed other than the child’s name, age, and date of birth.  
The interviewer attempts to develop a rapport with the child 
and asks open-ended, not leading questions.   
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fill up with green oil, which Ms. Helfman took to mean 
vomit.  Kamden moved in with the Eisenhart family, and he 
told Tina Eisenhart how his mom killed his friend Jordan 
when she hit him.  He told her that “mommy hit [Jordan] and 
pushed him back into a door and . . . he fell down and died.”  
JA 485.  He also told Ms. Eisenhart that he had a secret, 
which was that he saw “mommy . . .  kill[] Jordan.”  JA 488.  
Finally, Kamden and Staruh interacted at a supervised 
Children and Youth visit where Jimmy Jackson (Kamden’s 
father) and Jonathan Jackson (Kamden and Jordan’s infant 
brother) were present.  A Children and Youth Services 
employee named Jason Sullivan walked into the room, where 
Kamden was underneath a chair.  Kamden said “Jason, I have 
something to tell you.  The day that Jordan died mommy 
pushed him and he died.”  JA 501.  When Staruh asked how 
he knew that, Kamden said “I saw you.”  JA 501.   
 On December 2, 2005, after the prosecution asserted 
its intention to call Kamden to testify, a preliminary hearing 
was held in the presiding judge’s chambers pursuant to the 
Tender Years Doctrine.2  At the hearing, Kamden was able to 
                                                 
2 The Tender Years Doctrine provides that certain procedures 
must be followed whenever a prosecution or adjudication 
involves a “child victim” or “child material witness.”  42 Pa. 
C.S.A. § 5985.  As the first step, “the court must determine, 
based on evidence presented to it, that testifying either in an 
open forum in the presence and full view of the finder of fact 
or in the defendant’s presence will result in the child victim or 
child material witness suffering serious emotional distress 
that would substantially impair the child victim’s or child 
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communicate well and was knowledgeable about the world 
around him.  He showed his understanding of the importance 
of telling the truth and repeatedly expressed confidence that 
he could remember the events that occurred two years before 
when he was four years old.  After talking to Kamden again 
during a break in the trial, the trial court found him competent 
to testify.   
 Lois’ version of events – that she had nothing to do 
with Jordan’s injuries or his death – changed shortly before 
trial began.  Staruh’s mother pleaded guilty only to 
endangerment of children on June 24, 2005, and her attorney 
explicitly stated that her guilty plea was limited solely to her 
violation of her duty of care.  Staruh’s court-appointed 
investigator interviewed Lois on June 12, 2006.  During this 
interview, Lois admitted to the investigator that she had 
abused Jordan by hitting him on the ribs with a metal sweeper 
pipe numerous times, throwing him against the wall where he 
would hit his head, and restraining him with duct tape to keep 
him from getting up during the night.  She stated, “I think I 
am partly responsible for his death, not Candice,” JA 1041, 
and that Staruh would only ever yell or hit the baby on the 
bottom, not on the head or body.  She said that “I am leaving 
this in God’s hands.  And I must tell the truth as my daughter 
                                                                                                             
material witness’s ability to reasonably communicate.”  Id.  
§ 5985(a.1). 
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does not deserve to die for what I or Jackson3 probably did.”  
JA 1041.  Despite these revelations, Lois stated that if 
questioned in court, she intended to invoke her Fifth 
Amendment privileges.  Lois was appointed counsel to 
represent her in her capacity as a witness.   
 On June 21, 2006, the day that the trial began, Lois 
again spoke to the investigator while he was serving 
subpoenas on Lois’ two sons.  Lois said that “Candice did not 
hurt Jordan it was me – I have settled this with God and I will 
accept what occurs.”  JA 1043.  Such acceptance did not, 
however, include testifying.  Lois again said that if she were 
called as a witness she would assert her rights under the Fifth 
Amendment because “my Attorney said I could get in trouble 
if I say this in Court so I can’t.”  JA 1043.  On June 23, 2006, 
Lois called the investigator concerning a subpoena that she 
had received.  She said that if she testified her parole officer 
would put her in jail, and “I don’t want to go to jail,” but that 
her daughter was innocent and she wanted to help her.  JA 
1042.  Lois also said that she had something important to tell 
the investigator.  At this point, the investigator told her not to 
speak further about the case, as she now had counsel and 
everything that she said to him would be memorialized.   
 After trial began on June 21, 2006, Kamden and the 
three persons whom he made statements to testified for the 
prosecution.  Staruh’s defense implied that it was Lois, not 
                                                 
3 Lois allegedly told the investigator that James Jackson, the 
father of Jordan, also physically abused Jordan and that “a lot 
of the injuries would be seen on the baby when Jackson was 
alone with the baby.”  JA 1041. 
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Staruh, who killed Jordan.  She elicited testimony from 
Kamden that he sometimes called Lois “mom”; from Karen 
Helfman that when she asked Kamden his mother’s name he 
said something that sounded like “lettuce”; from the ex-wife 
of one of Staruh’s brothers that both Staruh and Lois treated 
Jordan poorly and Lois beat Jordan; and from the same ex-
wife that Staruh was shy, while Lois was dominant and 
controlling.   
 Staruh, who testified on her own behalf, stated that 
Lois abused Jordan and had abused Staruh as a child.  She 
said that she was afraid of her mother, which was why she 
never left her house, and that she had recently been diagnosed 
with battered woman syndrome.  Staruh also testified that on 
the day that Jordan died, he was on a stool watching cartoons.  
She said that she laid down for a few seconds, but got up 
when she heard Jordan fall.  According to her, she went over 
to check on him, and when she turned around Kamden told 
her that Jordan was getting sick.  Staruh testified that Jordan 
was throwing up, having trouble breathing, and looked “like a 
baby doll.”  JA 652.  While Lois attempted to perform CPR, 
Staruh ran next door to a neighbor’s house to call 911.  At 
trial, her story of the bruises differed from what she had told 
the EMTs, coroner, and the police throughout the 
investigation – that they were caused by previous falls and 
horseplay with his four-year-old brother Kamden.  Instead, 
she placed full blame for the bruises on her mother, Lois.  
However, she never identified her mother as the cause of 
Jordan’s death, saying “I didn’t see her do anything that 
caused him to actually die.”  JA 658.   
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 During the trial, but outside the presence of the jury, 
defense counsel called Lois as a witness.  Lois said that she 
was unwilling to testify and asserted her Fifth Amendment 
right to refuse to do so.  Defense counsel sought to have her 
assert the Fifth Amendment in the presence of the jury, which 
the trial court denied.  Following this ruling, defense counsel 
moved for permission to introduce the statements that Lois 
had made to the investigator as statements against her penal 
interests pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 
804(b)(3).  However, the trial court denied this motion, 
concluding that the statements lacked the indicia of 
trustworthiness required under Rule 804(b)(3) to introduce a 
statement against penal interest.   
 The jury acquitted Staruh of first degree murder, but 
found her guilty of third degree murder, aggravated assault, 
and endangering the welfare of a child.  In September of 
2006, Staruh was sentenced to 18 to 40 years imprisonment.   
II. 
 Staruh filed a direct appeal arguing, among other 
things, that if Lois’ invocation of the Fifth Amendment was 
proper, the court should have admitted her out-of-court 
statements to the defense investigator.  In its opinion in 
support of its judgment, the trial court stated, “the 
circumstances surrounding the statements demonstrate their 
untrustworthiness.”  JA 859.  The Pennsylvania Superior 
Court affirmed, holding that “the circumstances surrounding 
the statements against interest do not provide assurance of 
their reliability.”  JA 976.  Specifically, the Superior Court 
noted that Lois had repeatedly claimed that she bore no 
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responsibility for Jordan’s death for two and a half years 
before “confessing” on the first day of trial, that her 
confession came right before her daughter was to be tried for 
murder, and that she asserted her intention to invoke the Fifth 
Amendment when she realized that she could be tried for 
murder herself.   
 Staruh argued before the Superior Court – as she 
argues before us – that the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973), mandated 
reversal. The Superior Court rejected this argument, holding 
that the inculpatory third-party declarations in Chambers 
were more credible, and therefore distinguishable, for three 
reasons: (1) unlike in Chambers, Lois never signed a written 
confession and never intended to be held accountable for her 
statements; (2) Lois asserted her privilege against self-
incrimination and was unavailable to testify, whereas in 
Chambers the confessor testified under oath and the trial 
court erred in not allowing cross-examination about his 
confession; and (3) the confessor in Chambers had no reason 
to incriminate himself, while Lois had an interest in 
preventing her daughter from being convicted of murder.   
 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Staruh’s 
petition for allowance of appeal.  Staruh then filed a pro se 
Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA) petition.  Counsel was 
appointed, but subsequently withdrew and filed a no-merit 
letter.  The PCRA petition was dismissed as raising 
arguments that had previously been litigated, such as the 
Chambers claim before us, and because allegations 
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concerning newly discovered evidence were without merit.  
Staruh did not pursue this action further in state court.4   
 In 2011, Staruh filed a timely pro se petition for a writ 
of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, raising ten 
claims.  Magistrate Judge Smyser issued a report and 
recommendation that recommended denying the habeas 
petition, which Judge Caputo adopted.  However, upon 
Staruh’s later petition to amend, Judge Caputo vacated the 
order and granted her leave to amend her exhausted, non-
defaulted claims.5  In her amended petition, Staruh argued, 
                                                 
4 A prisoner filing a habeas petition under § 2254 must 
exhaust available state remedies before filing in federal court.  
28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A).  In Pennsylvania, a petitioner 
seeking state collateral relief may only raise arguments that 
have not been previously litigated or waived, 42 Pa. C.S.A. 
§ 9543(a)(3), in “the highest appellate court in which the 
petitioner could have had review as a matter of right.  Com. v. 
Morales, 701 A.2d 516, 518-20 (Pa. 1997) (quoting 42 Pa. 
C.S.A § 9544(a)(2)).  Thus, Appellant was not entitled to 
postconviction relief under the PCRA and exhausted her state 
remedies when her direct appeal was dismissed by the 
Superior Court.  She was not required to file a PCRA petition, 
and she similarly was not required to appeal the dismissal of 
such petition.  Lambert v. Blackwell, 134 F.3d 506, 519 (3d 
Cir. 1997).      
 
5 Judge Caputo held that the report and recommendation was 
adopted insofar as it determined that many of Staruh’s claims 
were procedurally defaulted.   
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among other issues, that the state trial court erred in not 
allowing the defense investigator to testify that Lois told him 
that she was at fault for Jordan’s death.  Staruh had counsel 
appointed to represent her in the habeas proceedings.   
 Magistrate Judge Schwab issued a report and 
recommendation holding that the Superior Court’s 
determination that Lois’ out-of-court statements were not 
made under circumstances that provided “considerable 
assurance of their reliability” was reasonable.  JA 1114.    
Specifically, the report and recommendation stated that 
“[g]iven the differences between this case and Chambers, 
Staruh cannot show that the Superior Court’s decision was 
contrary to or an unreasonable application of Chambers.”  R. 
& R., Staruh v. Winstead, No. 3:11-cv-01604 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 
13, 2015), ECF No. 28.  Because Staruh also failed to show 
that the Superior Court’s decision was based on an 
unreasonable determination of the facts, she was not entitled 
to habeas relief.6  In adopting the report and recommendation, 
the District Court noted the “significant factual differences” 
between this case and Chambers and that Lois’ extrajudicial 
                                                 
6 The Magistrate Judge also rejected Staruh’s argument that 
the trial court’s decision allowing Lois to invoke the Fifth 
Amendment violated Chambers because “Chambers simply 
did not deal with a witness who invoked the Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.”  JA 1108.  
The only Chambers argument before us on appeal is that 
concerning the statements made to the defense investigator. 
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statements were not reliable.  Staruh v. Winstead, No. 3:11-
cv-01604, 2015 WL 640662, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 13, 2015).  
In a slightly different analysis from the Superior Court, the 
District Court focused on three indicia of reliability in 
Chambers that were lacking here: (1) that the statements in 
Chambers were made immediately after the homicide, while 
the statements here were made on the eve of trial; (2) that the 
extrajudicial statements in Chambers could be confirmed by 
the sworn confession of the third party, while here there was 
no corroborative evidence to confirm Lois’ statements 
regarding her culpability; and (3) that the party in Chambers 
who made the extrajudicial statements was present at trial and 
could be cross-examined, while Lois invoked the Fifth 
Amendment and was unavailable to testify.  Id.    
III. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction over Staruh’s 
habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 and 2254.  We 
have jurisdiction over the District Court’s order denying 
Staruh’s habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 
2253.7  “Our review of the District Court’s decision is plenary 
because no evidentiary hearing was held.”  Eley v. Erickson, 
712 F.3d 837, 845 (3d Cir. 2013).  We therefore review the 
Superior Court’s decision under “the same standard that the 
District Court was required to apply.”  Lewis v. Horn, 581 
F.3d 92, 100 (3d Cir. 2009).   
                                                 
7 Although the District Court denied a certificate of 
appelability, a motions panel of this Court granted a 
certificate of appealability on August 24, 2015.   
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 We apply the highly deferential standard imposed by 
AEDPA.  28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 
773 (2010) (“AEDPA thus imposes a ‘highly deferential 
standard for evaluating state-court rulings.’” (quoting Lindh v. 
Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333 n.7 (1997))).  AEDPA prohibits 
the federal courts from granting habeas relief unless the state 
court’s decision “was contrary to, or involved an 
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, 
as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” 28 
U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), or if it was “based on an unreasonable 
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in 
the State court proceeding,” id. § 2254(d)(2).  The Supreme 
Court has called this standard “difficult to meet,” Harrington 
v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011), and it “demands that 
state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.”  
Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam).   
 A state court decision is “contrary to, or involved an 
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,” 
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), if it “applies a rule that contradicts 
the governing law set forth” by the Supreme Court or if it 
“confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable 
from a decision of [the Supreme] Court and nevertheless 
arrives at a result different from our precedent.”  Williams v. 
Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000).   
 A state court has based its decision on “an 
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 
evidence presented,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), “only if the 
state court’s factual findings are ‘objectively unreasonable.’”  
Eley, 712 F.3d at 846 (quoting Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 
322, 340 (2003)).  “Factual determinations by state courts are 
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presumed correct absent clear and convincing evidence to the 
contrary.”  Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340 (citing 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254(e)(1)).   
 In this case, Staruh asserts both grounds for AEDPA 
relief.  She argues “the rulings of the Pennsylvania courts 
excluding the exculpatory evidence are contrary to or an 
unreasonable application of federal law, and involve an 
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 
evidence presented.”  Appellant Br. at 21.   
IV.  
 Specifically, Staruh argues that the Superior Court’s 
application of Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3) 
violated her due process right to present a defense and was 
contrary to the Supreme Court’s decision in Chambers v. 
Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973). 
 Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3) provides 
that, if a declarant is unavailable,8 a statement against interest 
                                                 
8 It is not contested that Lois was unavailable as a witness 
because she refused to testify in her daughter’s trial.  Pa. R. 
Evid. 804(a) (defining unavailability to include situations 
where the declarant “is exempted from testifying about the 
subject matter of the declarant’s statement because the court 
rules that a privilege applies”); Commonwealth v. Bazemore, 
614 A.2d 684, 685 (Pa. 1992) (“A witness who invokes his or 
her Fifth Amendment privilege is deemed ‘unavailable’ for 
the purpose of testifying provided the court first determines 
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is not excluded by the rule against hearsay.  Specifically, the 
rule defines a statement against interest as one that: 
(A) a reasonable person in the declarant’s 
position would have made only if the person 
believed it to be true because, when made, it 
was so contrary to the declarant’s proprietary or 
pecuniary interest or had so great a tendency to 
invalidate the declarant’s claim against 
someone else or to expose the declarant to civil 
or criminal liability; and  
(B) is supported by corroborating circumstances 
that clearly indicate its trustworthiness, if it is 
offered in a criminal case as one that tends to 
expose the declarant to criminal liability.  
Pa. R. Evid. 803(b)(3). 
Here, although the requirements of (A) may have been 
satisfied, the requirements of (B) were not.  The Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court explains that this “rule requiring assurance of 
the trustworthiness and reliability of an out of court 
statement” is justified by “[e]xperience [that] teaches us that 
it is not rare for friends, peers and family members to go to 
extraordinary lengths to help an accused win an acquittal or 
avoid a jail sentence.”  Commonwealth v. Bracero, 528 A.2d 
936, 941 (Pa. 1987).   
                                                                                                             
that the witness’ concern with self-incrimination is 
legitimate.”).   
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Both parties properly focus their arguments on the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 
U.S. 284 (1973).  In Chambers, the defendant was convicted 
of murdering a police officer due in large part to the “strict 
application of certain Mississippi rules of evidence” that 
prevented him from introducing multiple inculpatory 
statements made by a third party or from treating a defense 
witness as adverse.  Id. at 289.  Such a strict application of the 
evidentiary rules “rendered his trial fundamentally unfair and 
deprived him of due process of law.”  Id. at 289-90.  Staruh 
similarly claims that the state court’s refusal to allow Lois’ 
inculpatory statements to the defense investigator deprived 
her of due process of law.  However, the Supreme Court in 
Chambers explicitly stated that its holding was limited to “the 
facts and circumstances of this case,” id. at 303, as the 
hearsay statements at issue “were originally made and 
subsequently offered at trial under circumstances that 
provided considerable assurance of their reliability.”  Id. at 
300.  Upon an examination of the facts of Chambers, it is 
apparent that we do not have comparable assurances of 
reliability. 
In Chambers, the defendant called a third party, named 
McDonald, as an adverse witness.  Id. at 288.  Two days after 
the murder of a police officer, McDonald had given a sworn 
statement to the defendant’s attorneys to the effect that he, 
McDonald, shot the police officer.  Id.  The confession was 
transcribed, signed, and witnessed, and McDonald was turned 
over to the police and placed in jail.  Id. at 288.  One month 
later, during a preliminary hearing, he repudiated his sworn 
confession and testified that he was not even at the scene of 
the crime.  Id.  McDonald was released, and the defendant 
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proceeded to trial.  Id. at 287.  When McDonald was called as 
a defense witness, the defendant had the confession admitted 
into evidence and read to the jury.  Id. at 291. On cross-
examination, the third party reiterated his version of the story 
that he did not shoot the police officer and that he had only 
confessed based on a promise that he would not go to jail and 
that he would share “in a sizeable tort recovery from the 
town.”  Id. at 291.  On redirect, the defendant sought to 
examine McDonald as an adverse witness, but was barred 
from doing so because McDonald’s testimony was not 
technically adverse to the defendant.  Id. at 291-92.   
In an attempt to argue that McDonald was the real 
perpetrator of the crime, the defense sought to call three 
witnesses.  One witness would have testified that McDonald 
told him that he had shot the police officer on the night of the 
crime.  Id.  The second witness would have similarly testified 
that McDonald confessed to him on the night of the crime and 
that McDonald reminded him of this confession a week later 
when he urged the witness not to “mess him up.”  Id.  The 
second witness would also have disavowed McDonald’s 
testimony that McDonald was not at the scene of the crime 
because he was having beers with the second witness.  Id.  
Finally, the defense sought to introduce the testimony of 
McDonald’s neighbor, who would have testified that 
McDonald told him on the morning after the crime that he 
had committed the murder.  Id. at 293.  McDonald also 
allegedly told the third witness that he had disposed of the 
firearm used in the murder, and the third witness went with 
McDonald to purchase a new revolver several weeks after the 
shooting to replace the murder weapon.  Id.  The jury, 
however, was not allowed to hear the testimony of any of 
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these witnesses, which were excluded as hearsay statements.  
Id.9 
 The Supreme Court recognized that hearsay statements 
“are traditionally excluded because they lack the conventional 
indicia of reliability.”  Id. at 298.  For example, they are 
usually not made under oath or under “circumstances that 
impress the speaker with the solemnity of the statements,” the 
speaker is not subject to cross-examination, and he is not 
available in court so that his credibility and demeanor may be 
assessed by the jury.  Id.  While there are exceptions to the 
hearsay rule, the Court noted that often confessions of 
criminal activity “are . . . motivated by extraneous 
considerations and, therefore, are not as inherently reliable as 
statements against pecuniary or properietary interest.”  Id. at 
300.   
                                                 
9 At the time, Mississippi did not have a hearsay exception for 
statements against penal interest such as Pennsylvania’s 
current Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3).  Chambers v. Mississippi, 
410 U.S. 284, 299 (1973).  Pennsylvania did not codify its 
rules of evidence until 1998, before which its evidentiary 
rules were matters of common law.  See Commonwealth v. 
Kimbell, 759 A.2d 1273, 1276 (Pa. 2000).  The Pennsylvania 
Rules of Evidence largely mirror the Federal Rules of 
Evidence.  See Pa. R. Evid. 101 Preface to Comments (“The 
Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence closely followed the format, 
language, and style of the Federal Rules of Evidence, but the 
guiding principle was to preserve the Pennsylvania law of 
evidence.”).   
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 Nonetheless, the exclusion of the statements in 
Chambers, in tandem with the state court’s refusal to allow 
the defendant to cross-examine McDonald “denied him a trial 
in accord with traditional and fundamental standards of due 
process.”  Id. at 302.  The Supreme Court gave four reasons 
why the statements “provided considerable assurance of their 
reliability.”  Id. at 300.  First, each confession “was made 
spontaneously to a close acquaintance shortly after the 
murder had occurred.”  Id. at 300.  Second, each was 
corroborated by other evidence in the case, such as 
McDonald’s sworn confession; the testimony of another 
eyewitness to the shooting; and the testimony that McDonald 
was seen holding a revolver similar to the type used in the 
shooting, was known to own a revolver of the type used in the 
shooting, and that he subsequently disposed of and then 
replaced this weapon.  Id.  The Court also noted that “[t]he 
sheer number of independent confessions provided additional 
corroboration for each.”  Id.  Third, the Supreme Court stated 
that “each confession here was in a very real sense self-
incriminatory and unquestionably against interest,” because 
there was nothing for McDonald to gain by disclosing his 
guilt to his friends and he “must have been aware of the 
possibility that disclosure would lead to criminal 
prosecution,” as further evidenced by his warning to the 
second witness to not “mess him up.”  Id. at 301.  Finally, the 
Court emphasized that McDonald was present in the 
courtroom and under oath, and thus he was subject to cross-
examination where his demeanor and responses could be 
weighed by the jury.  Id.  
 We have interpreted Chambers to stand for the 
proposition that a criminal defendant has a “due process right 
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to have clearly exculpatory evidence presented to the jury, at 
least when there is no strong countervailing systemic interest 
that justifies its exclusion.”  United States v. Mike, 655 F.3d 
167, 171 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Herman, 
589 F.2d 1191, 1204 (3d Cir. 1978)).  Thus, a state may not 
violate this right “by the strict application of certain . . . rules 
of evidence.”  Chambers, 410 U.S. at 289.  Pennsylvania 
courts have interpreted one systemic interest to be the 
inherent unreliability of such statements, as “it is not rare for 
friends, peers and family members to go to extraordinary 
lengths to help an accused win an acquittal or avoid a jail 
sentence.”  Bracero, 528 A.2d at 941.  Federal Rule of 
Evidence 804(b)(3) similarly requires that an inculpatory 
statement by a third party offered to exculpate a criminal 
defendant be “supported by corroborating circumstances that 
clearly indicate its trustworthiness.”  Fed. R. Evid. 
804(b)(3)(B).  We have interpreted this as a rule that “reflects 
the concern that a third party with less risk of prosecution will 
fabricate a confession to exculpate the guilty party.”  United 
States v. Caldwell, 760 F.3d 267, 289 (3d Cir. 2014).   
 Staruh acknowledges that the Court in Chambers noted 
that the statements there “bore persuasive assurances of 
trustworthiness,” Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302, but argues that 
“the Court did not limit what criteria govern such a finding.”  
Appellant Br. at 21.  She claims that Lois’ statements were 
trustworthy, given that they were made before and during 
trial; were made on more than one occasion to a court-
appointed investigator; were never repudiated; were very 
detailed; and were not the result of threats or inducements.  
However, the Superior Court properly distinguished these 
facts from Chambers.  Lois never signed a written confession 
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or indicated an intent to be held accountable for her actions, 
as evidenced by her refusal to testify out of a fear of going to 
prison.10  This is in stark contrast to McDonald in Chambers, 
who signed a sworn affidavit knowing that he was placing 
himself at risk of being convicted for the murder, Chambers, 
410 U.S. at 287, and acknowledged that his statements in the 
aftermath of the murder could “mess him up.”  Id. at 301.  
Moreover, McDonald made his incriminating statements 
immediately after the murder to multiple people before 
reversing course once he found himself facing criminal 
charges.  Id.  Here, by contrast, Lois maintained her 
innocence for the murder for over two and a half years, 
including under oath at her guilty plea hearing, before finally 
“admitting” to the crime on the eve of trial, and then only to 
the defense investigator. 
 We agree with the Superior Court that, unlike the 
evidence excluded in Chambers, Lois’ statements had no 
indicia of credibility.  Lois, in making the statements, was 
attempting to have her cake and eat it too.11  She was hoping 
to prevent her daughter from being convicted of murder by 
                                                 
10 Staruh attempts to argue that both the District Court and the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court improperly placed great weight 
on the fact that she did not testify while the third party in 
Chambers did.  While she is correct that Rule 804(b)(3) 
applies only to unavailable declarants, her failure to testify is 
extremely probative of the truthfulness of her statements. 
11 We also note that Staruh appears to have been unable to 
obtain an affidavit from Lois reaffirming her confession at 
any point during the federal habeas proceeding, casting 
further doubt on its truthfulness.   
24 
 
confessing to the crime, while at the same time avoiding 
criminal liability herself.  Her last-minute change of heart, 
after she had both pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of 
endangering a child and disavowed any responsibility for 
Jordan’s death for two and a half years, further supports this 
view.  This appears to be a “justice-subverting ploy” that 
provides the justification for requiring indicia of truthfulness.  
Chambers, 410 U.S. at 301 n.21 (discussing a scenario where 
person A is a defendant, person B tells persons C and D that 
he committed the crime and then goes into hiding, persons C 
and D testify at A’s trial, and then person B – who did not 
commit the crime – returns from hiding and has several 
witnesses to corroborate his innocence); Caldwell, 760 F.3d 
at 290 (holding that an inculpatory statement by a declarant 
was not reliable when he viewed the defendant “like an older 
brother,” providing a motivation to lie; the statement was 
made only to defense investigators and not to prosecutors; the 
declarant was not under oath, had not been read his Miranda 
rights, and was not represented by counsel; and the declarant 
ultimately recanted his admission); Bracero, 528 A.2d at 941 
(noting that “it is not rare for friends, peers and family 
members to go to extraordinary lengths to help an accused 
win an acquittal or avoid a jail sentence”).   
V.   
 For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the 
dismissal of Staruh’s habeas petition.   
 
 
